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This article examines the nature of collusion between the British state and paramilitary 
organisations during the conflict in Northern Ireland in the context of British 
counterinsurgency theory and practices in colonial campaigns. To do so it will briefly outline 
the pattern and logic of collusion in Northern Ireland before examining some of the key 
works in the tradition of British counterinsurgency theorists reflecting on earlier imperial 
practices. Collusion will be understood as an expedient coercive state practice, premised on 
a ‘doctrine of necessity’, designed to remove ‘enemies’ and induce fear in a target 
population via a strategy of assassination in which the appearance of adherence to the rule 
of law is a political end shaping the specific forms of state violence involved. Such a practice, 
it will be argued, is not an aberration in the tradition of British state counterinsurgency 
violence, it is exemplary. 
 
Keywords: Collusion, Counterinsurgency, Imperialism, State Violence, Northern Ireland 
 
Introduction: Collusion and Conflict in the North of Ireland 
 
Despite its considerable failings the 2012 release of the de Silva report into the loyalist 
killing of human rights lawyer Pat Finucane in his Belfast home in 1989 confirmed one thing 
beyond any doubt; collusion between British military intelligence and RUC Special Branch 
with loyalist paramilitaries during the conflict in the North of Ireland was widespread, 
institutionalised and strategic in nature. While long suspected, the true scale of such 
collusion was still something of a shock; not least the astonishing revelation that over 85% 
of all the intelligence held by loyalists in the late 1980s and used in the planning of an 
escalating campaign of sectarian killing and targeted assassinations originated from state 
intelligence sources.1 Indeed, this may well be an underestimation. At the centre of these 
activities was the British military agent Brian Nelson who, as the Chief Intelligence Officer 
for the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), was pivotal in disseminating this tsunami of state-
sourced information used in dozens of subsequent attacks and killings. Overly cautious and 
at times contradictory in his conclusions, de Silva still strongly suspected the passing on of 
intelligence by Nelson, particularly to target ‘republican personalities’ was instigated by and 
done at the behest of his handlers in the Force Research Unit (FRU), the key British Army 
intelligence unit in the North.2 Others would much go further. 
Similarly, while de Silva concludes otherwise, outstanding evidence continues to 
suggest MI5 involvement (via Nelson) in the importation of a substantial cache of weapons 
from South Africa in 1987 that facilitated the escalation of loyalist killings thereafter; to the 
point that by 1992 loyalists were responsible for more annual deaths than anyone else.3 At 
the same time, and despite extended discussions amongst members of the British 
Government, senior civil servants and legal advisers and high ranking members of the British 
Army, intelligence services and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), rules governing the actions 
of agents and informers that might have prevented such illegal activities were not 
introduced until after the conflict was over.4 The picture that emerges is under the guidance 
of state agencies such as the FRU, and via the work of agents like Nelson, loyalist 
paramilitary groups became a more deadly, sometimes more targeted force. The lethal 
capacity of loyalists was increased, the possibility of preventing attacks on ‘republican 
personalities’ significantly reduced and their killing, with the perpetrators escaping capture, 
made far more likely. We might conclude this was the result of what one author called a 
growing British State ‘interest in the increased military professionalisation’ of loyalists.5 
How should we understand such things and what might they tell us more broadly 
about the British state’s deployment of organised violence in counterinsurgency campaigns? 
The aim of this article is to place the sort of collusive practices carried out in Northern 
Ireland described above into the longer historical context of British colonialism and 
counterinsurgency thought and practice. To do so it will be divided into five parts. First, the 
article will examine what is meant by collusion before briefly exploring the links between 
collusion and shoot-to-kill as aspects of British counterinsurgency policy in the North, 
particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The article will then examine in turn the works 
of three key writers in the tradition of British counterinsurgency theory; Charles E. Callwell 
(1859-1928), Charles Gwynn (1870-1963) and Frank Kitson (1926- ).6 Each has been selected 
for several reasons. First, their careers cover the span of a century of British 
counterinsurgency theory and practice and their writings are regarded (not least by the 
British Army itself) as central to a tradition of theorising ‘irregular warfare’. Second, their 
works illuminate a series of themes essential for understanding the character of British 
counterinsurgency theory and how this may underpin a practice such as collusion. Finally 
each, in their own way, provides a link and connection between colonial conflicts elsewhere, 
counterinsurgency and Ireland. 
At the core of the article lies a question; what made collusion as a form of state 
practice possible? There is no simple answer and only one of several contributing factors 
will be focussed on here. It will be argued that the long term practices and forms of thought 
evident in the tradition of British counterinsurgency (COIN) are a necessary if insufficient 
condition to explain collusion. In doing so it aims to challenge two long-standing myths of 
British COIN; that it is characterised by a commitment to a minimum force doctrine 
combined with a non-coercive hearts and minds approach, and constrained by adherence to 
the rule of law. Rather, the article will make a case that the realities of the British COIN 
tradition form a critical backdrop to the ways of thinking and acting evidenced in the 
collusive practices of state actors in Northern Ireland. Illuminating key dimensions of British 
counterinsurgency casts a light on how collusion, as an example of covert, coercive state 
violence, could come to be. The aim is not to suggest there is a direct or simple cause-and-
effect relationship between this body of counterinsurgency theory and collusion. Rather, 
the threads identified within this lineage of British COIN illustrate a series of linkages, 
paradigms of theory and practice, that weave the fabric of a longer term cultural and 
institutional context within which collusion becomes possible; analogous, in many ways, to 
the corporate memory and institutional culture that facilitated the use of torture by ‘cruel 
Britannia’.7 As a form of state practice, it will be argued, collusion, far from being an 




First, though, we might ask, what is ‘collusion’? The origin of its use to describe state-
sponsored violence and secret collaboration between state forces and paramilitary groups 
in Northern Ireland is a little obscure. Certainly by the late 1980s and 1990s, collusion had 
entered the mainstream local political lexicon as the weight of such allegations (particularly 
of state forces working with loyalist groups) mounted. A 1995 Relatives for Justice report 
described collusion as ‘a sinister indirect campaign of murder which involved the 
manipulation of loyalist paramilitaries who were provided with security information and 
who then killed with the knowledge that they were free from prosecution’.8 The first official 
definition contained in the Stevens 3 Inquiry, (established in 1999 following fresh evidence 
surrounding the killing of Pat Finucane) described collusion in terms of a series of ‘serious 
acts and omissions’ by members of the RUC that resulted in people having been killed or 
seriously injured.9 The most substantive official definition of collusion is that provided by 
retired Canadian Judge Peter Cory following initial investigations he chaired at the behest of 
the British and Irish Governments in 2002 into several high profile collusion cases.  
For Cory, synonyms of the verb ‘collude’ (‘to conspire, to collaborate, to plot, to 
scheme’) formed the basis of his deliberately broad view. These include acts of ‘connivance’, 
turning a blind eye, failing to take action against known wrongdoing and ‘to have a secret 
understanding’ with those ‘one ought morally, or officially or legally to oppose’.10 Any lesser 
definition, Cory argued, would fail to instil or re-establish public confidence in the police, the 
army and the rule of law. Despite this, recent years have seen a concerted attempt, by 
Government officials and statutory bodies charged with dealing with the past, to curtail and 
limit this understanding of collusion; part of a wider post-conflict ‘politics of victimhood’, a 
widely criticised ‘roll-back’ of human rights gains made in the wake of the Good Friday 
Agreement and an effort to lessen the critical scrutiny of state actions.11 A rare exception to 
this trend was the Smithwick Tribunal, established by the Irish Government to investigate 
allegations of collusion between the Republic’s police force and the IRA in the 1989 killing of 
two senior RUC officers.12  
Following both Cory and Smithwick, state collusion is understood as the involvement 
of state agents (members of the police, army, prison and intelligence services) or state 
officials (Government ministers, legal officers, civil servants), directly or indirectly, through 
commission, omission, collaboration or connivance, with armed non-state groups or agents, 
in wrongful acts usually (although not exclusively) involving or related to non-state political 
violence.13 It is also important that collusion should not simply be attributed to, or examined 
in terms of individual actions or attitudes. Collusion has been ideologically and historically 
framed and shaped by the structures of a prevailing social order and a specific complex of 
power relations. It occurs within particular institutional settings, not least those of the 
British military, complete with its traditions and ‘corporate memory’. At times collusion is 
the outcome of the instrumental logic of those institutions, evidenced in broad patterns of 
institutional policies and practices. What we can therefore understand as institutional 
collusion might be defined in similar terms to institutional racism where patterns of such 
wrongful acts or omissions ‘overtly or covertly reside in the policies, procedures or 
operations and culture of public or private institutions’ forming a set of practices ‘inhered in 
the apparatus of the state and the structures of society’.14 
 
Counter-insurgency, Shoot to Kill and Collusion: Strategies of Extra-Judicial 
Killing? 
 
Collusion should not be seen in isolation nor as a practice restricted to the 
‘endgame’ of the Northern Ireland conflict. Throughout three decades a range of military 
and counterinsurgency strategies were employed by the state and the story of covert state 
activity and collusion in Northern Ireland goes back to at least the early 1970s with, for 
example, the creation of the Military Reaction Force (MRF). The MRF was a covert British 
Army intelligence unit, precursor to those such as the FRU to follow, consisting of members 
of the British Army in plain clothes operating as a ‘pseudo-gang’ involved not only in 
infiltration and intelligence-gathering but direct attacks and assassinations; some of an 
avowedly sectarian nature.15 As one former member recently revealed to a BBC Panorama 
documentary; ‘we [MRF] were not there to act like an army unit. We were there to act like a 
terror group’.16 There are allegations such units worked in tandem with loyalist 
paramilitaries in some of the most lethal events of the period; such as the McGurk’s bar 
bombing in 1971 and the Dublin-Monaghan bombings of 1974.17  
Formal and informal collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and locally-recruited 
state forces, particularly the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), was rampant.18 Most 
notoriously, between 1971 and 1978 a group of loyalists known as the ‘Glennane Gang’ 
killed some 120 people in counties Tyrone and Armagh. Many of those directly involved 
were members of the RUC and the UDR and there is substantial evidence they received help 
and support from higher up the chain of command in what amounted to a campaign of total 
war.19 Collusion also played its part in loyalist targeting and assassination of prominent 
political activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s (notably around the H-block campaign) 
including the killings of independent councillor John Turley, and of well-known republicans 
such as Miriam Daly, Ronnie Bunting and Noel Lyttle as well as the attempted killing of 
Bernadette McAliskey in 1981.20 
Collusion needs also be seen in tandem with evidence of a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy 
conducted by state forces during the 1980s and early 1990s. Again, allegations of targeted 
assassinations undertaken by specialist military units (such as the SAS) date back to the 
1970s. However a more comprehensive strategy emerged from the early 1980s onward, 
spearheaded by the SAS as well as militarised units within the police force.21 Shoot-to-kill 
incidents invariably involved republicans rather than loyalists and many victims were 
unarmed. The tactic of ‘set-piece killings’, planned ambushes undertaken by SAS units, was 
particularly concentrated in rural areas where the IRA had been highly active.22 For example, 
in East Tyrone, the pattern of set-piece killings points to a deliberate campaign of extra-
judicial killing, with an intensification of such attacks launched from the mid-1980s onwards. 
In 1987 this resulted in the death of eight IRA Volunteers at Loughgall (and another 
uninvolved civilian) following an SAS ambush; the single largest loss of life suffered by the 
IRA since the 1920s. Republican combatants, political activists, ex-prisoners and family 
members were also targeted and killed by loyalists in Mid-Ulster on a scale previously 
unseen. Many were killed by the Mid-Ulster UVF, led by the loyalist Billy Wright who was 
himself later killed in prison amid claims of collusion. Allegations of collusion have long been 
made in many of these Mid-Ulster loyalist killings carried out in the period between 1988 
and 1994. The ability of loyalists to successfully target so many republicans in East Tyrone 
and South Derry during this period have led to accusations they were provided with 
intelligence and allowed access and exit routes by state agencies. Many of these victims 
were also killed by weapons from the 1987 South African weapons shipment. In some cases 
(such as that of Roseanne Mallon, shot dead by the UVF in May 1994) British military 
personnel were close to the scene at the time of the killing.23 Of course these actions were 
taking place at the very same time as the FRU-inspired activities of Brian Nelson. Loyalists 
expressly viewed such attacks as designed to intimidate republican communities. Evidence 
of collusion suggests that logic was shared by the state. 
At the core of such thinking was the aim of making loyalist groups a more focussed 
and deadly counterinsurgency tool; a perspective exemplified in the attitudes and actions of 
the Head of the FRU at the time of the killing of Pat Finucane, Colonel Gordon Kerr. For 
example, when explaining why such effort was made to re-recruit Brian Nelson in 1985 
(when loyalist violence was actually at a very low ebb) and manoeuvre him into the position 
of Chief Intelligence Officer, Kerr argued it was to ‘persuade the UDA to centralise their 
targeting activity through Nelson and to concentrate their targeting on known PIRA 
activists’.24 When later Nelson was known by his FRU handlers to be passing targeting 
information to the ‘more aggressive’ UVF (which they previously lacked) even de Silva 
concludes this was no strategy to ‘save lives [but to] assist… in carrying out attacks on 
republicans’.25 That such an approach paralleled an intensifying loyalist campaign of nakedly 
sectarian assassination is testament to what the logic of ‘necessity’ actually entailed. As a 
practice collusion might then best be understood as a covert, intelligence-led form of state-
inspired or state-directed violence, involving the use of locally recruited ‘militia’ forces in a 
campaign that could at one and the same time remove ‘enemies’, intimidate a localised 
population and undermine their ‘will to resist’ via a campaign of assassination while 
preserving the façade of adherence to the rule of law. If such is the case, we might now ask, 
is the attitude of a Gordon Kerr, or evidence of the sort of practices carried out in the North, 
at odds with or redolent of the ‘calibration of lethal force’ within the tradition British 
counterinsurgency?26 
 
British Counterinsurgency, Colonialism and Ireland 
 
Charles Callwell and ‘Small Wars’: ‘Moral Force’ and Instilling Fear 
 
The theory, as well as the practice of British counterinsurgency has deep imperial roots 
although until relatively recently this tradition of ‘warrior-scholarship’ rarely mentioned 
Ireland. From the outset however, counterinsurgency thinking, colonialism and Ireland were 
intimately interlinked. The current British Army field manual on counter-insurgency, 
authored by the military’s ‘pre-eminent doctrine writer’ Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (who 
himself served during the conflict in the North) charts the foundation of British COIN from 
the publication of Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and 
Practice in 1896.27 Appearing at the height of Late Victorian imperial hubris Small Wars 
became the standard text on counterinsurgency for the British Army up until the Second 
World War and ‘firmly established [Callwell’s] reputation as the army’s foremost expert on 
colonial warfare’.28 Indeed the post-9/11 US and British invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq saw a resurgence of interest in Small Wars and cemented Callwell’s 
‘credentials as the founding father of modern counter-insurgency’.29 
Small Wars makes no mention of Ireland but there is a considerable Irish connection 
through its author. Charles Callwell was of solidly Ulster capital and Anglo-Irish landed 
stock.30 His family home was in Ballycastle, Co. Antrim and his father was a prominent 
Belfast-based businessman, his mother from a Galway landed family.31 Callwell himself was 
one of a generation of Anglo-Irish military men who rose to influential high office within the 
upper echelons of the British Army in the period prior to the First World War.32 He was 
particularly close to the most prominent, powerful and highly political of this coterie of 
Unionist senior military figures, one time Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall 
Sir Henry Wilson, ‘whom he [Callwell] had known since boyhood’.33 Wilson played a leading 
behind-the-scenes role encouraging the Curragh Mutiny and Unionist opposition to Home 
Rule in March 1914.34  Following the introduction of partition Wilson was elected Unionist 
MP for North Down in 1922 and appointed senior military adviser to the newly installed 
Northern Ireland Government, to act as the ‘strong man of Ulster’.35 A few months later he 
was assassinated by the IRA and it was his ‘fellow Irish Unionist and war veteran’ Callwell 
who ‘devoutly compiled’ and published Wilson’s controversial Life and Letters.36 
His own experience working in the intelligence branch of the War Office and earlier 
as a ‘soldier of empire’ in Afghanistan and South Africa greatly informed Callwell’s views on 
the conduct of Small Wars. In the latter, for example, he led a mobile column (apparently 
with little success) ‘hunting down elusive and widely scattered Boer commandos’ while 
serving under Lord Roberts, another powerful Anglo-Irish officer and Wilson’s benefactor 
who was himself at one point touted as a possible leader of the nascent Ulster Volunteer 
Force.37 Small Wars was also a compendium of various works on ‘irregular warfare’ and a 
study of not only British but also French, German and Russian colonial campaigns (as well as 
the genocidal efforts of the US against ‘Red Indians’). In essence, for Callwell, ‘small wars’ 
meant imperial and colonial wars and his lessons were primarily aimed at a British Army 
operating as an ‘imperial police force’.38 In this light, the absence of Ireland from the pages 
of Small Wars is perhaps all the more conspicuous as a result. 
For Callwell, the decisive factor in achieving victory in these conflicts that ‘dog the 
footsteps of the pioneers of civilisation’, fought against ‘lesser races’ and ‘savage enemies’ 
was what he termed the ‘moral force of civilisation’.39 Indeed this idea of ‘moral force’ was 
central to his thinking, and more important as a foundation for the development of British 
COIN theory than any conception of ‘minimum force’. More so than in conventional 
warfare, Callwell argued, force was to be used less for outright military victory than for its 
impact on insurgents and their base of popular support. This is what Callwell referred to as 
the ‘moral effect’ of organised violence. ‘Moral force’, he argued, was ‘even more potent 
than physical force’ in defeating colonial insurgents. Here ‘moral force’ may be taken as a 
synonym for instilling a sense of awestruck fear. As Callwell put it, in campaigns against 
‘savages and guerrillas’ the important thing was to develop a ‘system of overawing and 
terrifying [because that was] the great object always to be kept in view’.40 In turn, Callwell’s 
entire conception of the ‘moral effect’ of such counterinsurgency violence rested on the 
premise that the inherent inferiority of ‘lesser peoples’ meant they lacked the moral 
character and fibre that civilisation bestowed on imperial powers. The ‘lower races [were] 
impressionable’ and force was to be used as they ‘must be made to feel a moral inferiority 
throughout’ and so come to ‘recognise that the forces of civilisation are dominant and not 
to be denied’.41 This was in essence a ‘shock and awe’ strategy, designed to ensure that the 
uncivilised or ‘semi-civilised’ enemy ‘maintain his respect for the forces of civilisation’.42 In 
this sense, social Darwinian racism shaped the origins of modern counterinsurgency 
thought.43  
Conceiving counterinsurgency force as being directed at a ‘moral effect’, to impose 
itself upon the imagination of a colonised people, was also to understand it as a form of 
‘exemplary violence’ or a ‘performative of power’.44 Nor was this a ‘minimum force’ 
doctrine. Callwell was a stout advocate of a strategy of ‘butcher and bolt’; raids undertaken 
to destroy crops, livestock and buildings, to raze whole villages to the ground and lay waste 
to conquered areas so ‘fanatics and savages [could be] thoroughly brought to book and 
cowed… [so they would not] rise up again’.45 On the other hand, while not ‘minimal’, this 
was not wanton violence, but purposeful and strategic. For Callwell using sufficient violence 
to punish and ‘overawe’ the enemy, but not leading them to ‘exasperation [or] driven to 
desperation’, was the ‘end in view’.46 In other words, the state should employ whatever 
exemplary violence was needed to have the ‘moral effect’ of instilling the fear necessary to 
achieve the desired political outcome. As the foundation of a British COIN tradition, we 
might think of it as a coercive ‘hearts and minds’ strategy devoid of a ‘minimum force’ 
doctrine. 
 
Charles Gwynn and ‘Imperial Policing’: ‘Minimum Force’ and Military ‘Aid to the 
Civil Power’ 
 
Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing was first published in 1934 and became 
a standard text for training British Army imperial officers for decades thereafter.47 As in the 
case of Callwell, Gwynn’s background may help analyse the scope, tenor and nature of his 
key contribution to Britain’s counterinsurgency tradition.48 Like his predecessor, Gwynn was 
from an Irish Protestant family, though in his case of somewhat greater political complexity. 
Born in Ramelton, Co. Donegal in 1870, Gwynn was the son of a Church of Ireland clergyman 
(later Professor of Divinity at Trinity College, Dublin) while his mother was the daughter of 
the Young Ireland Movement leader, William Smith O’Brien. His eldest brother was the 
journalist, author and nationalist MP Stephen Gwynn; a leading figure in the Independent 
Irish Party and one of those to support John Redmond’s call and enlist in the British Army at 
the outbreak of the First World War. Stephen Gwynn’s frontline political career was ended 
when he lost his Galway seat to Sinn Fein in the watershed 1918 general election.49 Another 
brother joined the Indian Civil Service and later became the correspondent on Indian affairs 
for the Manchester Guardian. Most of his many other siblings pursued academic careers but 
Charles Gwynn joined the British Army at a young age and served in West Africa, the Sudan, 
Egypt and Australia before taking part in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign and serving on 
the western front during World War I. He went on to become Commandant of the British 
Army’s Staff College at Camberley until his retirement in 1931.50 
In Imperial Policing Gwynn set out to establish some ‘lessons to be learnt’ on the 
application of military power in the ongoing ‘small wars’ of empire, now re-cast as ‘policing 
duties’. He employed a series of case studies to make his point, all taken from the post-war 
period, and including the Amritsar massacre in India in 1919, examples from Egypt, Sudan, 
Cyprus and (in updated second and third editions) of the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936) and 
Waziristan (on the modern day border between Pakistan and Afghanistan) in 1937. Again 
notable by its absence is Ireland. Indeed, without stating clearly why, Gwynn thought it 
‘inadvisable to draw on experience in Ireland, instructive from a military point of view as 
many of them were’.51 Perhaps, given his family connections, the still relatively recent 
record of the actions of the Black and Tans in Ireland was a little too close to home. Rather 
he recommended anyone interested should consult the memoirs written by ‘some of our 
opponents’, such as Charles Dalton’s With the Dublin Brigade that ‘throw a light on the 
psychology of irregular forces and give an opportunity on seeing events from the other side 
which is generally lacking’.52 
From the examples he did explore Gwynn established four general principles for the 
conduct of ‘police duties’ when undertaken by the Army. At their core were two central 
concepts. The first was that the military should act only as an ‘aid to the civil power. 
‘Questions of policy’, Gwynn insists, should ‘remain vested in the civil Government’.53 The 
duty of the military was to provide advice but ‘the policy of the Government must be loyally 
carried out’. The second, that the ‘amount of military force employed must be the minimum 
the situation demands’; in other words, the ‘minimum force’ doctrine. Both were directed at 
what for Gwynn was the main ‘military object’ of such imperial policing duties; the 
preservation and promotion of the existing colonial order. Or (as Gwynn puts it) that the 
military should ‘re-establish the control of the civil power and secure its acceptance without 
an aftermath of bitterness’. 
These two core ideas worked in tandem and were to have a powerful, mystifying 
political and ideological effect. The idea the British military operated as an ‘aid to the civil 
power’ in carrying out ‘policing duties’ suggested legal accountability and adherence to the 
rule of law would be the norm. Much later, acting as an ‘aid to the civil power’ would (at 
least in theory) form the legal and constitutional basis of the British Army’s campaign in 
Northern Ireland. Yet there is a utilitarian logic evident throughout Gwynn’s thinking that is 
more broadly paradigmatic of British military counterinsurgency thinking and subverts any 
apparent commitment to such ‘principles’. His declaration of a ‘minimum force’ standard, 
for example, is ultimately predicated on a doctrine of necessity; the constraining limit of 
‘justifiable’ force rests in the end on a utilitarian calculation. Put another way, the amount 
of force permitted is, ultimately, whatever force is necessary to maintain order and promote 
interest. Here we see something akin to a legal concept of necessity, where ‘necessity 
creates its own law’. As critics of such an idea have argued, while often presented in 
objective terms a principle of necessity is ultimately founded on a subjective, political 
decision, that ‘the existing juridical order is threatened with ruin…[and] the existing order 
must be preserved’.54 Poor ground on which to forge a long term commitment to legally-
binding limitations on state violence; as was amply illustrated in the pages of Imperial 
Policing itself. 
If Gwynn saw Imperial Policing as a means to outline a supposed commitment on the 
part of the British military to the rule of law and use of ‘minimum force’ this was somewhat 
contradicted by his own analysis of a conflict dominating debates on counterinsurgency as 
the book went into subsequent editions; the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939).  Tellingly, 
he also sought to use events in Palestine to portray what he characterised as the ‘difficulties 
troops encounter’ when their actions were supposedly ‘restricted in furtherance of an 
extreme conciliatory policy’.55 Indeed, for Gwynn, it was such an alleged ‘policy of 
conciliation’ that was the ultimate cause of the revolt. Rather than giving the British military 
commander in Palestine a ‘free hand [to] re-establish order’ such ‘conciliation’ had been 
taken as a ‘sign of weakness’ that could only ‘intensify disaffection’ among Arab nationalists, 
further encouraged by ‘concessions won in Ireland’ and elsewhere.56  
Revealing the contradictions lying at the heart of the myths of British 
counterinsurgency, Gwynn wanted to show how ‘restrictions placed on the actions’ of 
British Forces in Palestine had apparently only accentuated these problems.57 He 
complained bitterly such crippling conditions had resulted from the work of ‘propagandists’ 
charging British troops with ‘misconduct’ that had prevented, among other things (and with 
direct parallels with Israeli policies in the present) the use of aircraft to bomb Arab villages 
and a punitive policy of house demolitions.58 The latter, he noted admiringly, had included 
the ‘Jaffa demolition scheme’ which he likened to a form of progressive urban re-
development with ‘two thoroughfares’ cut through the ‘rabbit warren of the old native 
quarter [that had] greatly improved the situation’.59 In an interpretation indicative of his 
conception of minimal force, the Jaffa house destruction scheme was for Gwynn a good 
example of undertaking decisive, offensive, fully authorised and planned action, because 
houses from which shooting had come were destroyed with ‘a minimum damage to 
neighbouring property’.60 
Contrary to Gwynn’s view, the roots of the Arab Revolt would be better 
characterised as the result of systematic repression than benign ‘conciliation’, and links with 
Ireland were more apparent than his account might suggest. After the British Mandate in 
Palestine was established in 1922 the new police force was modelled on the RIC and 
included many former Black and Tans in their ranks.61 The first Chief of this new force (as 
well as Commanding Officer of the British Army in Palestine) was Major-General Henry Hugh 
Tudor; formerly Head of the RIC and creator of the ‘Black and Tans’. He was also Head of a 
newly created ‘gendarmerie’. Between 75% and 95% of this new auxiliary force (around 650 
men) had previously been members of the ‘Black and Tans’.62 After the gendarmerie was 
disbanded in 1926 many former Black and Tans remained and joined the British section of 
the Palestinian police force. One such was Douglas Duff, who had served in Galway during 
the Tan War and subsequently became Chief of police in Jerusalem. His part in establishing a 
policing regime built on general, causal violence in the street and of systematic brutality 
within the force’s prisons and interrogation rooms (that included the use of water-boarding 
and ‘suspensions’) is the apparent origin of the term ‘duffing up’; the colonial police 
colloquialism for torture.63 
After the outbreak of the Revolt itself repression gathered pace. Police violence was 
rampant with beatings and extra-judicial killings. Torture centres were set up. Suspects were 
tortured, humiliated and subject to ‘third degree’ questioning, following in the brutal 
tradition established by Duff.64 ‘Frustration’ with the supposed leniency of local courts led to 
many Arab suspects being shot ‘while trying to escape’.65 The 1936 Jaffa house destruction 
so lionised by Gwynn had in fact resulted in the blowing up of some 220 to 240 buildings 
and over 6,000 Palestinians being made homeless. It formed part of an escalated official 
reprisals policy which saw many other groups of houses demolished, property looted, food 
stores systematically destroyed, forced labour, ‘punitive village occupations’ and the 
imposition of crushing collective fines.66 Some ‘bad’ villages were completely razed to the 
ground.67 As historian Matthew Hughes has argued, the ‘policing’ of the Arab revolt was 
built around ‘premeditated, systematic, officially sanctioned brutality in the form of 
collective punishments and reprisals’.68 
The British Army was involved in summary executions with widespread instances of 
Arabs being tied to the bonnets of vehicles of military convoys to ‘deter’ mine attacks.69 
Wounded Arab fighters were sometimes left to die while others were shot en masse while 
surrendering; some by members of the Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR).70  Indeed members of the 
RUR were amongst British troops involved in one of the most notorious atrocities in the 
Arab village of al-Bassa in late 1938. After four RUR soldiers were killed in a roadside bomb, 
al-Bassa (as the nearest village) was burnt to the ground, but only after RUR soldiers 
rounded up 50 Arab men, put them on a bus and forced the driver to drive over a mine. The 
bus was completely destroyed and the villagers were forced to bury the mutilated bodies of 
the dead in a hastily dug pit.71 100 villagers were also taken to a nearby Army camp and four 
of the group were whipped and tortured in front of the others. Al-Bassa was not an isolated 
incident. Orde Wingate (himself emerging as a key British counterinsurgency practitioner) 
created what were known as ‘Special Night Squads’. These consisted of British and Jewish 
settler policemen moving at night (sometimes disguising themselves as Arabs) who 
terrorised Arab villages, humiliating and killing Arab civilians. They were a foreshadow not 
only of the counter-gangs later developed in Kenya by Frank Kitson, and those involved in 
collusion in Northern Ireland,  but (as Laleh Khalili notes) were also ‘something of a model 
for  subsequent Israeli Special Forces’.72 
Yet, as Hughes also argues, ‘moral restraint’ was not absent and a ‘veneer of legal 
respectability’ was maintained by the British Authorities throughout the revolt.73 Most 
(though not all) of what was done was sanctioned by military command, control structures 
and ‘proper authority’. Most was also ‘legal’. In essence, the law was modified as ‘necessary’ 
so that punitive, violent state actions remained within its bounds. Here again we see a key 
thread in the character of British counterinsurgency, that is in turn reflected in the logic of 
Imperial Policing. In formal terms at the outbreak of the Arab Revolt the British Army did 
operate as an ‘aid to the civil power’ as Gwynn recommended. However, they also acted 
within the framework of military law, which allowed, amongst other things, imposing 
collective punishments on Palestinian villages.74 While martial law was never officially 
declared de facto a state of ‘statutory martial law’ existed. Military law specifically allowed 
the existence of armed insurrection ‘would justify the use of any degree of force necessary 
to meet and cope with the insurrection’.75 Military courts dispensed something 
approximating summary justice and Arab civilians and combatants were not given the 
protection of the emerging body of international law (i.e. the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions). While formally subject to the law, the legal process operated in such a way 
that prosecution of British soldiers was all but non-existent.76 
All this was entirely consistent with Gwynn’s own recommendation that success 
would be achieved by a ‘vigorous repressive policy’ combining air bombing, the use of the 
police for ‘intelligence duties… martial law methods [and] the punishment of lawbreakers by 
special courts’.77 In reflecting on events towards the end of the Revolt he noted approvingly 
that military courts able to impose the death penalty had been put in place, Arab leaders 
arrested, their organisations banned, there had been ‘round-ups of villages’ and rebel 
groups met in battle had been ‘roughly handled’.78 In a pointer to the future, he still awaited 
a ‘reliable force of native police as a source of intelligence’. Indeed Gwynn’s only reservation 
concerning the state’s use of coercive violence (perhaps again with Ireland in mind) had 
been that a policy of reprisals ‘was always dangerous’.79 This was not, though, because of 
any squeamishness on his part. Rather it was on the same grounds expressed many years 
before by Sir Henry Wilson during the Irish War of Independence. It was not reprisals as 
such that worried Gwynn but a lack of ‘command and control’. When undertaken by 
‘ruthless’ irregular forces the backlash was likely to be felt by ‘defenceless loyalists’. What 
was therefore needed was a ‘codifying of rules’ and a policy of reprisals that was ‘publicly 
stated and… duly authorised’. The message was clear; counterinsurgency violence, while it 
might be wholesale and overwhelming, should not be out of control or unrestrained, and 
had to be ‘legitimised’ through the authority of command structures and by shaping the law 
to the task in hand. The resort to some dubious, racist portraits could also serve to 
‘legitimise’ the violence deployed against a dehumanised colonial (in this case, Arab) 
‘Other’. 
 
Frank Kitson, Kenya and Ireland: Low-Intensity Operations, the Rule of Law and 
‘Counter-Gangs’ 
 
Of all British military theorists none is more immediately relevant to the conduct of 
counterinsurgency during the conflict in Northern Ireland than General Sir Frank Kitson. 
Between 1970 and 1972 Kitson commanded 39 Brigade with overall responsibility for British 
troops in Belfast and, while John Newsinger is right to insist the so-called ‘Kitson 
experiment’ was neither as original nor as comprehensively enacted as has sometimes been 
suggested, Kitson was certainly heavily involved and influential in the subsequent 
development of British counterinsurgency strategy in the North.80 Before taking up this role 
he had earlier served in Kenya, Malaya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus and wrote about the 
counterinsurgency lessons garnered from these experiences in three books; Gangs and 
Counter-Gangs (1960), Low Intensity Operations (1971) and Bunch of Five (1977).81 Much of 
this work provides a heavily sanitised account of his career, reducing the Kenyan campaign 
for example, among the ‘bloodiest of post-war British military operations… to the level of a 
Boys’ Own adventure story’.82 In actuality a cumulative and concerted attempt to theorise a 
British national security state, these writings presented a starkly militarist manifesto at the 
heart of which once more was a counterinsurgency doctrine of necessity.83  
A number of key themes can be identified in Kitson’s work. There is a considerable 
focus on the importance of intelligence and propaganda, the use of covert operations and, 
perhaps most famously (and of the clearest direct relevance to the issue of collusion) on the 
role of Police Special Branch and the local recruitment of covert militia forces; or what were 
termed  ‘pseudo-‘ or ‘counter-gangs’.84 In addition, and more so than for earlier 
generations, Kitson and his contemporaries were greatly concerned with need to order the 
rule of law to the ends of counterinsurgency. In this he reflected the times and the 
demands, in the post-1945 period, to at least give the appearance of a commitment to 
international law and human rights standards. This had been far less of a worry for the likes 
of Callwell or Gwynn, operating as they did when there was little need for imperial powers 
to recognise the legal status of colonial subjects. The inter-war Mandate system had been 
something of a way station on the re-interpretation of colonialism in international law and 
(as in the case of Palestine) had involved a codification of the legal provisions governing the 
state use of force; often inherited as a legal framework for repressive practices in the 
postcolonial state.85 However, by and large, colonial peoples had continued to be excluded, 
implicitly or explicitly, from the protection afforded by international conventions intended 
to constrain the use of force against civilian populations. Such had been the case, for 
example, in the Conventions drawn up by European imperial powers and the USA in the 
1930s intended to prohibit the aerial bombardment of civilians. The bombing of colonial 
civilian populations, on the other hand, was rather regarded as a new opportunity for cost-
effective imperial rule.86 It was a time when, as Frank Kitson noted wistfully, ‘soldiers were 
able to carry out their tasks without excessive wear and tear on their consciences’.87 
A notional post-1945 British counterinsurgency ‘rule of law’ commitment might best 
be seen in this light; as necessary (in theory if not in practice) to ward off potential criticism 
of a failure to meet new international legal standards. In that sense Gwynn’s earlier 
advocacy of martial law stands in contrast to a dominant strain in the tradition of British 
counterinsurgency where a formal declaration of the suspension of legal norms has tended 
to be regarded as politically problematic and counter-productive. Adherence to the ‘rule of 
law’ was, for example, one of the five key principles identified by Kitson’s near 
contemporary Robert Grainger Thompson, whose experience as a colonial administrator 
during the Malayan ‘Emergency’ (1948-1960) and as a military adviser in the early years of 
the Vietnam war, was the basis of his Defeating Communist Insurgency; still regarded as 
pivotal for British counterinsurgency thinking.88 Despite (of course) the appalling record of 
British and US brutality in those self-same conflicts. Recent scholarship has again shown 
illegality and a resort to massive, widespread repressive and coercive state violence 
characterised British state action in Malaya.89 In other words, the ‘British tradition’ of 
counterinsurgency is one that has generally sought to give the appearance of maintaining 
legal norms and normalcy, whatever the reality.  
Kitson (who served in Malaya at the same time as Thompson) echoed the latter in his 
twin focus on the political dimensions of counterinsurgency and the issue of the rule of 
law.90 For a soldier to measure right and wrong Kitson proposed two ‘yardsticks’; the law 
and ‘expediency’. At first sight his view on the law appears absolutist. Whatever course of 
action is available to a soldier, he insisted, if it is ‘illegal it must be avoided’.91 Because 
insurgency and subversion are defined by being ‘unlawful’ and ‘unconstitutional’ 
counterinsurgency should never be undertaken ‘in any other than a lawful and 
constitutional way’.92 Indeed, alongside acting as an ‘aid to the civil power’, winning the 
‘war for the minds of the people’ and establishing an effective intelligence organisation, a 
commitment that ‘everything done by a government and its agents in combatting 
insurgency must be legal’ formed the four core principles of Kitson’s counterinsurgency 
thesis.93 
How does such an apparent absolute commitment to abiding by the rule of law sit 
alongside ‘expediency’? Any apparent contradiction is not as great might first appear. What 
constitutes legality, and how it is shaped and adapted according to circumstances, ends and 
interests is what matters here. ‘It is a function of government to make new laws’, insisted 
Kitson and ‘if necessary’ to adapt the way the law is administered. What is required is ‘a 
legal system adequate to the needs of the moment’.94 In other words, expediency should 
govern the legal order. As has recently been argued, Kitson’s ‘theorising was not interested 
in the ethics of counter-insurgency – just in getting the job done’.95 In that vein he was 
entirely in step with the utilitarian strain at the core of the British counterinsurgency 
tradition in which the ‘ethics’ governing the deployment of coercive state violence were 
premised on the calculation of ‘necessity’; a ‘calibration of lethal force’ according to the 
state’s own self-identified need. His understanding of the relevance of the rule of law might 
be seen in a similar light.  
Kitson suggested two ways in which the law could work during an insurgency. One 
was for it to remain ‘impartial’, ensuring that (even when new ‘tough’ laws were 
introduced) equality before the law was a governing principle and ‘the officers of the law 
will recognise no difference between the forces of government, the enemy, or the 
uncommitted part of the population’.96 Yet, while acknowledging such a position might be 
‘morally right’, Kitson argued this was oft-times ‘unworkable’. Necessity might therefore 
require an alternative approach, according to his (with good reason, oft-quoted) maxim that 
the ‘law should be used as just another weapon in the government’s arsenal, and in this case 
it becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of 
the public’. In other words, and entirely in keeping with a ‘peculiarly British way’ of 
counterinsurgency, the key problem was to ensure the civil authorities generated a juridical 
order that allowed state agents to do ‘what was necessary’ to preserve its interests. The key 
question for the political system was to find ways to ensure the protection of state agents in 
conducting counterinsurgency operations by making, if required, what might otherwise be 
illegal, legal.  
For Kitson intelligence work, covert operations and the use of Special Forces were 
central to counterinsurgency. In Kenya, creating as effective intelligence system was his first 
priority and framed much of his later thinking.97 The need for an ‘effective’ intelligence 
system was also his key reason for a advocating a ‘necessary adaption’ of the administration 
of the law and the entire process of arrest, interrogation and imprisonment; so as to 
maximise the potential for recruiting informers and agents and dissuading others from 
following the insurgent path.98 In recommending the rapid expansion and de-centralisation 
of intelligence organisation Kitson also noted (demonstrating no little skill in the art of 
understatement) this might lead to ‘the possibility of the odd indiscretion’.99 These should 
be accepted by the Government, he argued, as ‘essential risks [so that] the necessary action 
is taken’. 
Kitson did not invent ‘counter-gangs’ and a wider reliance on using ‘locally recruited 
allies’ in a variety of guises (as a source of intelligence and to provide the necessary 
manpower on the ground) was characteristic of virtually all of Britain’s counterinsurgency 
campaigns before and since, up to and including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.100 
‘Counter-gangs’ were also but one strand of what amounted to a campaign of state terror. 
Alongside it a force of some 25,000 ‘local loyalists’, operating in ‘loosely controlled small 
units’, was the ‘most efficient and most covert method of delivering a policy of state-
sponsored terror’ and ensuring the compliance of the population.101 Given he could write in 
the late 1970s of having had to waste too much time ‘investigating fictitious atrocities 
allegedly committed by loyalists’, it seems reasonable to assume this campaign of state 
terror in the countryside troubled Kitson’s conscience little, regarded as a permissible 
means to meet the Government’s ‘first duty’ during an emergency; to ‘regain the allegiance 
of the population’.102 The recent official recognition provided by the 2011 British High Court 
judgement of the regime of systematic torture deployed against thousands of those held in 
British-run detention camps, similarly casts a mournfully belated light on the realities of a 
counterinsurgency campaign much at odds with Kitson’s self-congratulatory narrative. 103    
Kitson was certainly an unequivocal advocate of the effectiveness of ‘counter-gangs’ 
in Kenya and elsewhere and their creation and deployment was clearly central to his 
conception of counter-insurgency. This would be exemplified in his setting-up the Military 
Reaction Force in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s; the forerunner and template of the 
covert units such as 14th Intelligence Company and the Force Research Unit that were to 
follow. Indeed, given the state’s difficulties in conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in 
Northern Ireland (as a place ‘closer to home’, where the treatment of a ‘white’ European 
population was more exposed to the glare of international opinion and there was a political 
premium to deny any ‘inconvenient’ colonial comparisons) ‘covertness’ and deniability were 
all the more ‘necessary’ as means to preserve the appearance of ‘constitutional 
normalcy’.104 Such was the logic behind the ‘containment’ strategy introduced from the 
mid-1970s. It also shaped the ever-greater orientation of British state policy from the early 
1980s onwards towards an intelligence-led strategy, combining the deployment of covert 
units and Special Forces in targeted operations with a reliance on a burgeoning network of 
informers and agents. In similar vein, neutering the powers of inquests to investigate 
disputed killings and the ever-broader legal interpretation of ‘reasonable force’ when state 
agents employed lethal force points to an ongoing concern to subvert the rule of law to the 
ends of counterinsurgency. It is in that context too that we might view the particular pattern 
of collusion evident in the 1980s and early 1990s as the honing of the role of ‘counter-gangs’ 
to achieving the ends of counter-insurgency. A pattern of thought and state practice not 




On 30th January 1972 a then youthful Captain Mike Jackson was second in command of 
Support Company of the Parachute Regiment, the unit responsible for the murder of 13 
innocent civilians in Derry and colloquially known as ‘Kitson’s private army’.105 On return to 
their Belfast barracks, Jackson later recalled, his commanding officer Derek Wilford was met 
by Kitson. The latter, while ‘generally supportive’ had only one point of criticism about the 
Paras actions, asking ‘why, having got that far in [to the no-go area of the Bogside] you 
didn’t go on and sort the whole bloody mess out’?106 For Jackson Kitson may have been 
‘brusque’ and expressed himself ‘’brutally’ but ‘knew his soldiering’ and ‘had a point’. 
Jackson’s own chief concern was the charge the Paras had ‘run amok’ given the British 
‘Army is very proud of professionalism’.107 So the events of Bloody Sunday were 
remembered over three decades later by (now General Sir) Mike Jackson, former Head of 
the British Army and commander of British Forces following the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq. In his evidence to the Saville Inquiry in 2002 Kitson would still describe those 
responsible for Bloody Sunday as a ‘jolly good’ unit.108 
During the years of the ‘War on Terror’ Jackson has been prominent (though far 
from alone) among those propagating the myths of British counterinsurgency.109 The origins 
of a supposed ‘peculiarly British way’ of going about ‘military business’ are happily 
acknowledged as lying ‘deep in our [British] history’, extending back through an imperial 
past ‘at least a couple of centuries to Ireland, to India a century and a half ago, to Africa 
about the same time and, indeed, to Iraq almost a century ago’.110 The campaign in the 
North of Ireland is for Jackson an exemplar of British counterinsurgency, characterising the 
Army’s role as to ‘prevent the unlawful use of violence’ while creating the conditions for a 
political resolution to the problem of having ‘two peoples on one piece of territory’.111 As he 
sees it the ‘trick’ in counterinsurgency is ‘applying force that has profound political 
connotations’, balancing a concern for being seen as ‘too faint-hearted’ or ‘too harsh’ in the 
battle for ‘hearts and minds’.112 
Such themes are echoed by the author of the current British Army manual on 
Counterinsurgency. The ‘wider political purpose’ of counterinsurgency lies always at its core, 
writes Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, while it is the ‘political potential’ rather than ‘military power’ 
of insurgents that represent ‘the true nature of the threat’.113 Finding means to undermine 
the support base for insurgent groups is therefore the ‘strategic centre of gravity’ with the 
end being to ‘shatter the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion rather than seek his 
wholesale destruction’. In that process, however, the ‘physical destruction of the enemy still 
has an important part to play’, calculated on the ‘degree of attrition necessary’. In other 





As Raymond Murray long ago noted, Kitson was ‘no innovator’ and his model the product of 
a longstanding tradition of British colonial policy and principles of counterinsurgency.114  
 Collusion provides a bridge between the campaigns of colonial counterinsurgency in the 
past and those of the present…. 
The attitudes of Gordon Kerr are very much in line with this tradition of thinking. After 
leaving Northern Ireland Kerr also went on to serve in Iraq, as the first commander of the 
Special Reconnaissance Regiment…. 
 
The on-going campaign of nakedly sectarian assassination  
 
 
Similarly, Kerr could be thoroughly dismissive of the rules in place governing what informers 
and agents could  
 
His attitude toward the absence of rules governing the handling of agents and informers 
exemplifies this ‘doctrine of necessity’.  While critical of political leaders …  
 
In many ways the story of collusion provides a bridge between campaigns of colonial 
counterinsurgency in the past and the imperial interventionism of the present. 
 
 
Much here rests on the oft-proclaimed commitment to adherence to the rule of law. Being 
bound by the rule of law is invariably cited by contemporary military proponents of COIN as 
an absolute principle. As we have seen, this too stands in the long tradition of colonial 
counterinsurgency theorists. However, as Frank Kitson’s formula on the rule of law 
condition demonstrated, such legal absolutism is more apparent than real; a form of 
‘magical legalism’.115 The recent revelations concerning the de facto immunity from 
prosecution given to British soldiers involved in using lethal force in the North are testament 
to what this can mean in practice.116 The same might be said for the ever-expanding 
parameters of ‘reasonable force’ employed as a defence against ‘shoot-to-kill’ allegations. 
The creation of a lacuna in the law governing the actions of agents and informers can be 
viewed in like manner. It permitted what Giorgio Agamben would call the ‘in-acting’ of the 
law and created the space in which collusion became a strategically convenient possibility. If 
the story of collusion reveals anything it is that, in the context of counterinsurgency, the 
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